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ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeal of -)	
)	
Parsons Government Services, Inc.)	ASBCA No. 60662
)	
Under Contract No. M67854-09-D-8000)	

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Michael R. Rizzo, Esq.
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DECISION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WOODROW ON
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This dispute centers around a requirements contract awarded to Parsons Government Services, Inc. (Parsons) for the provision of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training systems (the HS MOUT contract). Parsons contends that the HS MOUT contract obligated the government to procure all of its urban training systems needs from Parsons during this period. However, the government awarded other contracts for allegedly similar work to different companies, prompting Parsons to allege a breach of the contract’s requirements clause. Parsons argues the contract covered a broad range of MOUT supplies and services, while the government maintains its obligations were limited to specific contract line item numbers (CLINs) requested by the Marine Corps’ training center acquisition arm (the Marine Corps System Command Program Manager for Training Systems or PM TRASYS).

Parsons moves for partial summary judgment on Parsons’ first claim issue, alleging that the government breached the requirements provision of the contract, as alleged in Parsons’ First Cause of Action (compl. ¶¶ 94-99). We deny the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS (SOF) FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION

A. HS MOUT Contract

1. On November 10, 2008, Parsons submitted to PM TRASYYS its technical proposal in response to Solicitation No. M67854-07-R-8147 for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Training Systems (gov't resp., ex. B at GOVPROD967606, 946124-25). PM TRASYYS "serves as the training systems acquisition arm for the Marine Corps" and is the "one specific agency" with the responsibility to ensure that US Marines "receive proper material, weaponry, tutelage, education, equipment and systems for training" (gov't resp., ex. C at GOVPROD1811368-69).

2. On March 18, 2009, PM TRASYYS awarded Contract No. M67854-09-D-8000, a requirements contract, to Parsons (R4, tab 1 at 1) (HS MOUT contract). The contract's period of performance spanned from March 2009 to March 2014. HS MOUT stands for Home Station Military Operations in Urban Terrain. HS MOUT systems provide a tactical training environment for US Marines prior to their deployment to the Middle East and are comprised of structures, buildings, and components that Parsons would assemble to replicate environments that soldiers would encounter in the Middle East. The purpose of a MOUT training system is "to ensure that Marines are properly trained prior to deployment for real world operations in the Third World" (R4, tab 1 at 1139).

3. The contract's scope of work (SOW) stated that the contractor was to "perform a mix of engineering analysis, design, fabrication, and installation of MOUT Training Systems" and that the systems were to be "non-permanent, modular, reconfigurable, removable" (R4, tab 2A at 1295).

4. The estimated value of the HS MOUT Contract was approximately \$978 million (R4, tab 1 at 1).

B. CLINs in the HS MOUT Contract

5. The contract details an urban terrain training system built from standard, commercially available materials (R4, tab 1B at 1169). The training system is to be modular, non-permanent, reconfigurable, and relocatable (*id.* at 1169, 1172; R4, tab 1A at 1139).

6. The contract allows for the MOUT training systems to be used for non-live fire, live-fire, or a combination of both types of training, and includes structures, utilities, roads, tunnels, courtyards, and targets (R4, tab 1A at 1139; tab 1B at 1169).

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7. The contract included nearly 5000 CLINs detailing supplies and services, as outlined in Section B of the contract (R4, tab 1 at 1-967).

8. CLINs 0001-0003, 1642-1644, 2642-2644, and 3642-3644 are firm-fixed price CLINs dedicated to design engineering (R4, tab 1 at 2-3, 322-23, 643-44, 965-66).

9. CLINs 0004, 1646, 2646, and 3646 are also firm-fixed price and cover the provision of technical data and information reports (R4, tab 1 at 3, 323, 645, 966).

10. CLINs 1000-1080, 2000-2080, and 3000-3080 are firm-fixed price and relate to live-fire shoot house structures and training, with specifications detailed in contract section 3.7 (R4, tab 1 at 4-44, 324-64, 645-85; tab 1B at 1178-86). These include components like façade systems and ballistic protection (*id.* at 44-70, 364-90, 686-711).

11. CLINs 1133-1498, 2133-2498, and 3133-3498 are firm-fixed price and pertain to non-live fire shoot house structures and training, detailed in contract section 3.8 (R4, tab 1 at 70-253, 390-573, 712-894; tab 1B at 1186-1200). These include items like minarets and guard towers (*id.* at 196-253, 516-573, 838-894).

12. CLINs 1499-1507, 2499-2507, and 3499-3507 are firm-fixed price and cover relocatable and modular building configurations, with specifications in contract section 3.9 (R4, tab 1 at 253-57, 573-77, 895-99; tab 1B at 1200-20).

13. CLINs 1508-1510, 2508-2510, and 3508-3510 are time and material CLINs, covering labor, materials, and professional services for training site preparation (R4, tab 1 at 258, 578, 899-900, 1220-38).

14. CLINs 1511-1641, 2511-2641, and 3511-3641 cover additional items like faux elements, HVAC systems, and electrical systems, at the discretion of PM TRASYS (R4, tab 1 at 259-321, 579-642, 901-64).

15. CLINs 4000-4999 are designated as “TBD” (To Be Determined) “with respect to a particular geographic region or assignment” (R4, tab 1 at 967).

16. The HS MOUT contract includes CLINs 1645, 2645, and 3645 for “over and above” (OAWR) work requests, allowing for flexibility in addressing unforeseen training requirements (R4, tab 1 at 323, 644, 966, 1169).

C. Exceptions to the Requirements Provision

17. The HS MOUT contract excludes certain work from Parsons' responsibilities, including work related to the CA MOUT contract, the TVCS Instrumentation contract installation, and the Targetry contract (app. mot. at 13-14; R4, tab 1A at 1139).

D. Relevant FAR Clauses in the HS MOUT Contract

18. The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulation ("FAR") clause 52.216-21, REQUIREMENTS (OCT 1995), which states, in relevant part:

[T]he Government shall order from the Contractor all the supplies or services specified in the Schedule that are required to be purchased by the Government activity or activities specified in the Schedule.

(R4, tab 1 at 1126-27)

19. The HS MOUT contract included an order limitation of \$250,000 as set forth in FAR 52.216-19, ORDER LIMITATIONS (OCT 1995):

Minimum Order... When the Government requires supplies or services covered by this contract in an amount of less than \$250,000 . . . the Government is not obligated to purchase, nor is the Contractor obligated to furnish, those supplies or services under the contract.

(R4, tab 1 at 1126)

20. In total, the government issued multiple delivery orders to Parsons for a total contract value of approximately \$185 million in requirements (app. mot. at 3).

E. The ADA Investigation

21. In 2015, the Department of the Navy initiated an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation investigation into PM TRASYS' conduct under the HS MOUT Contract (app. supp. R4, tab 27). The final investigative report found total violations in the amount of \$70,133,853.19 under 31 U.S.C. § 1517(a) and 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) on 17 of the 34 Delivery Orders issued under the HS MOUT contract (*id.* at 2). The violations generally involved the incorrect use of funds, other than military construction (MILCON) funds, because the contract required construction (R4, tab 27 at 8-36). The ADA Report found that the violations occurred between

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2009, when the HS MOUT Contract was awarded, and 2013, when the final funding modifications were processed (*id.* at 2).

F. Work Allegedly Diverted to Other Contractors

22. On January 22, 2008, prior to the award of the HS MOUT contract, PM TRAYSYS awarded contract 8017 to Ahntech, Inc. (Ahntech) (app. supp. R4, tab 6 at 1). The contract was for “Contractor Operation and Maintenance Services (COMS) with Supply Support” for Marine Corps facilities at 29 Palms, California and Yuma, Arizona (*id.* at 111, 116).

23. In its complaint, Parsons identified 20 contracts that were awarded to contractors other than Parsons during the period from June 2009 to March 2014 and that allegedly were for work that was within the HS MOUT scope of work (compl. ¶¶ 24, 25).

24. In its supplemental brief, Parsons identified an additional six contracts that allegedly were diverted to other contractors during the HS MOUT period of performance (app. supplemental br. 4-7).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Parsons filed a motion for partial summary judgment, supported by a declaration from counsel and attached documentation. The Government filed a response. On April 12, 2024, Parsons filed supplemental briefing and supplemental facts in support of its original motion for partial summary judgment. In its supplemental brief, Parsons cited the findings of an internal Army criminal investigation into alleged Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations, which concluded that the government improperly used non-MILCON (military construction) funds for construction work under the HS MOUT contract. Parsons argued this motivated the government to divert work to other contractors to avoid further funding violations and undermined the government’s argument that diverted construction contracts were outside the scope of the HS MOUT contract. (App. supplemental br. at 2-3, 8). Additionally, Parsons identified six new diverted contracts totaling nearly \$25M, further evidencing a pattern of diversion and increasing its claimed damages.

The government has not yet filed a response to Parson’s supplemental brief because it is awaiting further action from the Board on the pending motion for partial summary judgment (Bd. corr. ltr. dtd. September 5, 2024).

On March 11, 2025, Parsons filed a request to bifurcate entitlement and quantum on the issues pending in its motion for partial summary judgment. On

April 1, 2025, the government wrote stating its opposition to bifurcation and asking the Board to rule upon appellant's motion as submitted.

II. THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

Parsons argues that the HS MOUT Contract was a requirements contract, obligating the government to order all its needs for MOUT training systems from Parsons during the contract's period of performance from March 2009 to March 2014 (app. mot. at 8; app. supplemental br. at 7). Parsons claims that the government breached the contract by awarding at least 26 other contracts, valued at over \$102 million, to different companies for work that fell within the scope of the HS MOUT contract (app. mot. at 6; app. supplemental br. at 7-8). Parsons contends that these diverted contracts covered MOUT supplies and services that Parsons was capable of providing under the broad scope of its contract, as evidenced by the contract's language, the large number of CLINs, and the inclusion of an "over and above work request" (OAWR) clause (app. mot. at 12; app. supplemental br. at 7). Parsons also argues that none of the limited exceptions to the requirements clause applied to these diverted contracts (app. mot. at 13; app. supplemental br. at 8).

In its supplemental brief, Parsons highlights an Army investigation finding that the government improperly used non-MILCON funds for construction under the HS MOUT contract, arguing this motivated the government to divert work to other contractors to avoid further ADA violations, thus undermining the government's argument that the diverted work was outside the scope of the original contract.

Additionally, Parsons identified six new diverted contracts totaling nearly \$25M, further evidencing a pattern of diversion and increasing its claimed damages. These contracts, Parsons argues, fall within the HS MOUT Contract scope and were even categorized as "HS MOUT" by PM TRASYs. (App. supplemental br. at 7, 9, 11) As a result of the breach, Parsons claims financial harm and seeks damages for lost profits, overhead, and G&A (app. mot at 15; app. supplemental br. at 11).

Conversely, the government maintains that its contractual obligation was limited to specific CLINs requested by PM TRASYs for non-permanent, reconfigurable MOUT systems. The government argues the "over and above work request" clause was discretionary (gov't resp. at 11-12). For each of the diverted contracts, the government argues that the work was different from what Parsons was contracted to provide, often citing differences in the type of work (e.g., construction, maintenance), the beneficiary (e.g., Navy instead of Marines), or the awarding agency (gov't resp. at 20-44). The government also contends that some of the diverted contracts fell under specific exceptions in the HS MOUT contract, such as work associated with other named contracts, contracts below a certain dollar threshold, or

set-asides for small businesses (*id.* at 12, 21-30, 35-44). Finally, the government challenges the accuracy and reliability of Parsons' damage calculations (*id.* at 17-19).

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

We will grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the decision. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). As the moving party, Parsons bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and we must resolve all significant doubt over factual issues in favor of the government. *Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States*, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Once Parsons has met its burden of establishing the absence of disputed material facts, then the government must set forth specific facts, not conclusory statements or bare assertions, to defeat the motion. *Pure Gold, Inc. v. Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc.*, 739 F.2d 624, 626-27 (Fed. Cir. 1984). "A genuine issue of material fact arises when the nonmovant presents sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable fact finder, drawing the requisite inferences and applying the applicable evidentiary standard, could decide the issue in favor of the nonmovant." *C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. United States*, 6 F.3d 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

Requirements contracts prioritize a buyer's operational flexibility, allowing them to adjust consumption based on unpredictable needs – often in exchange for a premium price. See *MPG West*, ASBCA No. 61100 *et al.*, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,203 at 185,534 (on motion for reconsideration, describing Federal Circuit's holding in *Tech. Assistance*, 150 F.3d at 1372). While buyers have significant freedom to determine their requirements, this is not unlimited. The law requires buyers to act in good faith, meaning variations in requirements must be driven by legitimate business reasons, not simply a desire to renegotiate the contract or avoid obligations. Decreasing requirements solely to gain a better deal is considered bad faith and can be legally challenged to protect the seller from undue hardship. See *Tech. Assistance Int'l, Inc. v. United States*, 150 F.3d 1369, 1372, 1373-1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

The "party alleging a breach of contract bears the burden of proving the breach." *Tech. Assistance Int'l*, 150 F.3d at 1373 (citing *Perry v. Department of the Army*, 992 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Thus, Parsons must prove that the government lacked a legitimate business reason for using other contractors. Otherwise, the government "will be presumed to have varied its requirements for valid business reasons, *i.e.*, to have acted in good faith, and will not be liable for the change in requirements." *Tech. Assistance Int'l*, 150 F.3d at 1373.

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B. Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate

This appeal is not suitable for summary judgment at this stage for several reasons. Initially, Parsons has not demonstrated the government acted in bad faith or lacked a legitimate business reason for using other contractors. In its motion, Parsons does not dispute the initial government estimate of \$978 million; instead, it argues the actual \$184.4 million spent proves the government wrongly diverted work elsewhere (app. mot. at 10). However, even if true, this argument does not provide enough evidence to demonstrate the government lacked a legitimate business reason for using other contractors.

Second, the parties have a fundamental disagreement about what “supplies or services specified in the Schedule” of the contract actually covers. This disagreement, and Parsons’ use of evidence outside the contract to support its interpretation, shows that the scope of this clause cannot be determined without further evidence, as the record is not sufficiently developed to resolve the dispute. Finally, the parties disagree on many important facts relevant to the ultimate decision in this case.

1. A Hearing is Necessary to Determine the Scope of the Requirements Clause

The HS MOUT contract incorporated the FAR clause 52.216-21 (Requirements), which states, in relevant part:

[T]he Government shall order from the Contractor all the supplies or services specified in the Schedule that are required to be purchased by the Government activity or activities specified in the Schedule.

(SOF ¶ 18)

This language is not intrinsically ambiguous. However, Parsons and the government fundamentally disagree on the *scope* of the requirements clause, specifically regarding what constitutes “supplies or services specified in the Schedule. . . .” (*id.*). The schedule of supplies and services encompasses nearly 5000 separate line items (SOF ¶ 7). Our precedent requires us to compare the work done on each of the allegedly diverted contracts to the “supplies or services specified in the Schedule.” *D.J Miller*, 11-BCA ¶ 34,856 at 171,468.

Parsons advocates for a broad interpretation encompassing various MOUT-related needs (app. mot. at 8-10; app. reply at 5-12), while the government argues for a narrow interpretation limited to specific CLINs for design, fabrication, and installation of MOUT training systems (gov’t resp. at 9-13). This fundamental disagreement over

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the scope of the requirements clause demonstrates that the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. *Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States*, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Parsons supports its broader interpretation of the requirements clause with the contracting officer's statement and extensive testimony from other government employees (app. mot. at 12-15; app. reply at 14-16). This reliance on extrinsic evidence further demonstrates that the contract language is ambiguous. As the Federal Circuit held in *Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States*, 838 F.2d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1988), summary judgment is inappropriate when contract terms require consideration of external evidence. 838 F.2d at 1183 (citation omitted); see *Sauer Constr., LLC*, ASBCA No. 63738, 25-1 BCA ¶ 38,744 at 188,345 (citing *Beta Sys., Inc.*, 838 F.2d at 1183 for the same proposition).

The parties also make arguments concerning the limiting provisions of the requirements clause, such as specific exclusions, minimum dollar thresholds, and specific purchase requirements (app. mot. at 13-14; gov't resp. at 12-13). This debate suggests that requirements clause language is not entirely clear or comprehensive on its own. The parties also disagree regarding the intended use and discretion of the "over and above work request" (OAWR) clause. Parsons argues for a mandatory interpretation (app. reply at 15-16; app. supplemental br. at 7), while the government contends its use was discretionary (gov't resp. at 11, 15).

Finally, in its supplemental brief, Parsons introduces extrinsic evidence concerning an internal ADA investigation. The ADA investigation found significant funding violations and concluded that the work performed by Parsons required military construction (MILCON) funds but was instead paid for with other appropriations. Parsons contends that these findings undermine the government's argument that the HS MOUT Contract included only supply and service work and did not include construction work (app. supplemental br. at 10-11). Not only does this argument concerning the scope of the clause demonstrate the clause's ambiguity, but Parsons' reliance upon extrinsic evidence further undermines any contention that the scope of the requirements clause cannot be resolved without a hearing.

2. Disputed Facts Preclude Summary Judgment

In addition to the ambiguity surrounding the scope of the requirements clause, the government raises a host of disputed facts concerning whether the allegedly diverted contracts were actually within the scope of Parsons' contract, pointing to differences in the type of work, the beneficiary, and the awarding agency for each contract (gov't resp. at 20 - 45). Additionally, the government asserts that there are factual disputes concerning the applicability of various contractual exceptions and

limitations (gov't resp. at 12), as well as whether Parsons possessed the capability to perform the work that was allegedly diverted.

We conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate because numerous factual disputes remain regarding whether the government was obligated to award any of the 26 contracts allegedly diverted to other contractors to Parsons. Instead of addressing each contract individually, we will focus on one contract as an example of the factual issues that must be resolved at hearing.

3. Disputed Facts Regarding the Ahntech Contract

Parsons argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the government breached the requirements clause by awarding three delivery orders to Ahntech, Inc. under Contract No. M67854-08-C-8017. Parsons claims that the work required of Ahntech, including shock-absorbing concrete (SACON) repair and maintenance for container-type structures, as well as the supply of live fire MOUTS, MOUT assault courses, and Conex boxes, fell within the scope of the HS MOUT Contract. Parsons compares the specific work elements in the Ahntech contract to the CLINs in the HS MOUT Contract to demonstrate this overlap (app. mot. at 3-4).

In response, the government raises several key areas of factual dispute. First, the government contends that it awarded the base Ahntech contract (No. M67854-08-C-8017) to Ahntech *before* the HS MOUT Contract, relieving it of any obligation to award that work to Parsons (gov't resp. at 20-22). The parties also disagree over the factual question of whether the work was procured by separate delivery orders or modifications to the base contract. Parsons argues the relevant actions were delivery orders issued during the HS MOUT contract period (app. reply at 21-23). However, the government maintains these were not delivery orders at all, but were contract modifications; as such, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Parsons was entitled to work under that modification (gov't resp. at 21; gov't facts at 25). This disagreement – whether the government modified the contract or issued delivery orders for the disputed work – is a central factual issue, and it remains unclear whether either action would constitute a breach of the requirements clause.

Second, the government argues that one of the modifications to the Ahntech contract increased its value by only \$244,548.87 – an amount below the \$250,000 ordering threshold in the HS MOUT contract, and therefore was not work Parsons was entitled to perform (gov't resp. at 21). Parsons counters that the total work awarded to Ahntech exceeded \$2 million, rendering the individual modification amount irrelevant. This creates a factual dispute over the overall value of the Ahntech contract increase and whether it was done to circumvent the ordering requirements of the HS-MOUT contract.

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Third, the government disputes Parsons' claim that the Ahntech contract had the same scope of work as the HS MOUT Contract. The government contends that the Ahntech contract involved *maintenance* of live fire MOUTS, MOUT assault courses, and Conex boxes – not their *supply* (gov't facts at 26). It also disputes that the real property maintenance or explosive ordinance disposal storage container requirements in the Ahntech contract were covered by any corresponding CLINs in the HS MOUT contract (gov't facts at 26, 27). Finally, the government points out that the Ahntech contract, unlike the HS MOUT contract, lacked CLINs for live fire shoot houses and cement, further challenging any assertion of equivalence (gov't facts at 28). Parsons, however, contends that it did similar work under the HS MOUT contract, thereby demonstrating that it could have performed the work in the Ahntech contract (app. reply at 33).

These discrepancies cannot be resolved by reviewing the contracts alone. The Board must hear testimony about the work actually performed under both contracts to determine if Parsons was capable of performing the work assigned to Ahntech. Parsons' assertion of overlap is insufficient to meet the standard for summary judgment. As the Federal Circuit held in *Mingus*, any significant factual doubt must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. 812 F.2d 1390-91.

4. Disputed Facts Regarding Parsons' Damage Calculations

In its most recent filing before the Board, Parsons requested that we bifurcate entitlement and quantum on the issues pending in its motion for partial summary judgment. On April 1, 2025, the government wrote stating its opposition to bifurcation and asking the Board to rule upon appellant's motion as submitted. Because we conclude material factual disputes preclude us from granting summary judgment as to entitlement, there is no need to reach any conclusions relating to quantum.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we deny Parsons' motion for partial summary judgment.

Dated: June 3, 2025



KENNETH D. WOODROW
Administrative Judge
Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals

(Signatures continued)

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
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I concur



OWEN C. WILSON
Administrative Judge
Acting Chairman
Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals

I concur



MICHAEL N. O'CONNELL
Administrative Judge
Vice Chairman
Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60662, Appeal of Parsons Government Services, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter.

Dated: June 3, 2025



PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS
Recorder, Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals